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Abstract 
 
Issues: The 21st Century has ushered in a time of unprecedented global wealth and extraordinary opportunities; 
but Africa has yet to benefit from this. From Darfur to the jungles of the River Zaire, from the Eritrean plateau to 
South Sudan, from trouble Somalia to the genocidal communities of Rwanda and Burundi, from the violent cities of 
Kenya to Northern Uganda, new faces and forces of vulnerability haunt the Greater Horn of Africa. Under militarised 
governance and with mostly short-term thinking, these are often not seen as `national security' issues at all and 
are considered a lower priority than military and security affairs. Or if they are considered national security issues, the 
response is to prepare for any military threats that may transpire, rather than addressing the underlying causes. 
 
Objectives: The paper will address threats to national security, real and potential, that include, among others: lack of 
constitutional order; incapacity to manage disputes; threats of invasion and destabilisation; terrorism; contested 
borders and natural resource jurisdiction – blood diamonds; small arms; poverty related unrest; ethnic conflicts; 
feeble governance institutions; human displacement and pandemics. 
 
Conclusion: Because the security debate has changed dramatically sine the inception of state security advocated 
in the 17th century international community urgently needs a new paradigm of security. The state remains the 
fundamental purveyor of security. Yet it often fails to fulfil its security obligations -- and at times has even become 
a source of threat to its own people. The peace and security strategy developed here shifts the debate from the 
state security to human security; that brings together the human elements of security, of rights, and of 
development.  
The author presnets the Darfur humanitarian operation is one of the largest operations in a single location so far in 
the continent.  Our recommendations here are designed to reinforce such worthy actions and highlight the urgency 
of halting gender-based violence and provide relief and post-conflict reconstruction to the Darfuri IDPs and 
refugees. 
BT Costantinos, CHE May 2007
  
I. Introduction 
Because the security debate has changed dramatically sine the inception of state 
security advocated in the 17th century international community urgently needs a new 
paradigm of security. In the 21st century, both the challenges to security and its protectors 
have become more complex. The state remains the fundamental purveyor of security. 
Human security means protecting fundamental freedoms - freedoms that are the essence of 
life. It means protecting people form critical (severe) and pervasive (widespread) threats 
and situations. It means using processes that build on people's strengths and aspirations. It 
means creating political, social, environmental, economic, military, and cultural system that 
together give people the building blocks of survival, livelihood and dignity. The vital core of 
life is a set of elementary rights and freedoms people enjoy. What people consider to be 
"vital" - what they consider to be "of the essence of life" and "crucially important" -- varies 
across individuals and societies. That is why any concept of human security must be 
dynamic. 
Human security complements "state security" in four respects: Its concern is the 
individual and the community rather than the state. Menaces to people's security include 
threats and conditions that have not always been classified as threats to state security. The 
range of actors is expanded beyond the state alone. Achieving human security includes not 
just protecting people but also empowering people to fend for themselves.  States security 
focuses on other states with aggressive or adversarial designs. States built powerful security 
structures to defend themselves and their boundaries, their institutions, their values, and 
their numbers. State security has meant protecting territorial boundaries with - and from 
uniformed troops Human security shifts from focusing on external aggression to protecting 
people from a range of menaces. 
  Hence the Greater Horn of Africa needs to draw elaborate plans to develop regional 
mechanism for peace and security for the Region.  Meta-assumptions to be tested and 
indicators used are the rule of law, budgetary policies and priorities administrative and 
bureaucratic consistency, political openness and tolerance participation and communication 
favourable environment for private enterprise detailed assumptions and indicators civil 
service, with appointments based on merit civil service compensation is comparable to other 
sectors - independent of the political party in power there is an elected legislature which is 
responsible to the electorate and has oversight over governmental policy there are  robust 
civic organisations. 
 Applied data collection focused on participatory, affordable, easy to understand and 
useful techniques. Stakeholders at district and regional levels will be consulted for their 
views, experience, and inputs to the assessment process fully participatesd in identification 
of lessons learned and formulation of recommendations. In addition to the primary data, 
secondary data were collected from different organisations to feed in into the peace and 
security strategy and mechanism development process. Key Informants– telephone 
interviews with certain knowledgeable personalities from various walks of life were 
interviewed. Electronic focus groups discussions were held among working groups of 
relevant government officials, community leaders, public sector employees, service users.  
 The paper has also benefited from the consultations on a Strategy for Peace and 
Security in the The Greater Horn of Africa Region Opening Conference, Khartoum, Sudan 1-
3 October, 2005 underpinned the concern to promote peace and stability in the region.  
 Section I of the paper presnets the methodology and protocols. The next sections dwell 
on state security and human Security, State security - underlying causes of conflicts and 
security architecture, Human security and alternative intra-party management, meta-
assumptions to be tested and indicators to be used in the peace and security strategy and 
mechanism development process and conclusion. 
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II. Methodology and research protocols 
 
 In the following is outlined the kind and types of information gathered, data collection 
techniques used and the analysis system that were utilised to organise, interpret and 
present findings. For clarity purposes, we have organised the information to be collected in 
line along the major components of the assignment. Applied data collection will focus on 
participatory, affordable, easy to understand and useful techniques. Stakeholders at district, 
region, and community levels were consulted for their views, experience, and inputs to the 
assessment process and would fully participate in identification of lessons learned and 
formulation of recommendations. Information gathering/ data collection and analysis were 
conducted in close co-ordination and consultation with all stakeholders and authorities. In 
order to obtain the information needed to answer the above questions, the following data 
collection techniques were used. 
• Literature Review - used in its broadest sense, meaning a survey of sources available 
in the contemporary research knowledge systems on peace and conflicts. The key object 
is to inform the review of the current and up-to-date knowledge about the peace and 
security strategy and mechanism development process that has in its background 
documents state of the art think tank pieces to consult on.  
• Survey Instruments – a series of interview instruments that reflect the range of issues 
and questions contained in the peace and security strategy and mechanism development 
process assignment were developed and administered. The questions were designed to 
collect a wide range of factual and attitudinal data on the peace and security strategy 
and mechanism development process.  
• Official Records - in addition to the primary data, secondary data were collected from 
different organisations to feed in into the peace and security strategy and mechanism 
development process. These data mainly will come from existing records of government 
bureaux and other organisations associated with them.  
• Key Informants – interviews were held with certain knowledgeable personalities from 
various walks of life. These include officials, community leaders, members of 
disadvantaged and marginalised groups and others considered having particular insight 
to the issues. Lengthy and detailed discussions were held as to their conceptualisation of 
the peace and security strategy and mechanism development process objectives, 
activities, effects, impacts and underlying assumptions of the peace and security 
strategy and mechanism development process. Information obtained from key 
informants was invaluable in understanding the context within which the programme 
operates. 
Case Studies - in addition to the survey-generated data, in-depth case studies were 
done on randomly selected cases in Darfur, to feed in into the strategy and mechanism 
development process. The purpose of these in-depth case studies is to gain a better 
understanding of local conditions by allowing the stakeholders to illustrate and expand 
on some of the points raised by the survey. Respondents were probed in detail and were 
encouraged to discuss their assessments in a non-structured manner. 
Electronic Focus Group discussions were held among working groups of relevant 
government officials, community leaders and other pertinent stakeholders to develop the 
peace and security strategy and mechanism. The objective is to get the broadest 
possible opinion and crosscheck and verify the findings with those directly involved 
through open e-forums.  
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II. Assessment of regional security crises (Darfur Case Study) 
1. Rape as a savage instrument of humiliation: The story of every IDP interviewed is 
repeatedly the same as if the prescriptions for rape has been commandeered and 
organised by a central organs carefully synergised for maximum impact. A number of 
women IDPs told the Technical Mission of having been repeatedly and cruelly raped. 
Some resort to the general complaint of abduction as rape in the local cultures has 
consequences that women must pay, to get away with it. Raped women in cultural and 
Sharia contexts are excommunicated from the community and very often stoned and 
flogged publicly if they are found pregnant. Some women and girls have been publicly 
raped in front of their families and communities have only been to tell their stories to 
NGOs and human rights groups as well as AMIS and CIVPOL women police. All point to 
the fact that it is not of any help to the GoS police who have been ‘cited’ as perpetrators 
of rape in their own uniforms. This fact points to attempts both to subjugate the women 
and humiliate the whole community. Arab militias called Janjeweed kill, rape and rob 
Sudanese Africans in the process of quelling a rebellion against the GoS that began in 
February 2003.i  
2. The rise of vigilante gangs in the IDP camps: Perhaps a disturbing new 
phenomenon is the rise of local vigilantes in the IDP camps that now administer the 
camps forcibly and have replaced the Government of Sudan police in one Kalma Camp, 
Nyala Sector in Southern Darfur, visited by the Technical Mission. The vigilantes have 
taken over policing of the camp and deliver justice as they see it fit. They exact 
obedience from the IDPs and carte away large sums of money from the IDPs including 
officials of NGOs. They have been reported to engage in rape and violence against 
women. This development may be a harbinger of a grand design to destroy the life of 
the Darfuris.  
3. Death of non-combatants: It is indeed difficult to zero in a figure of the number dead 
under the hands of the perpetrators. While the accurate figure may never be unknown in 
the foreseeable future, estimates have stated that 200,000 to 300,000 have died since 
the start of the Darfur conflict.ii In attacks on villages there has often been an emphasis 
on the killing of the male population. Instances have been reported of males being 
rounded up and taken away from villages to be shot.iii Some reporters and relief agency 
staff expressed surprise at the small number of wounded refugees entering the camps. 
In fact, the wounded were entering the camp. The brutal response to the Darfur uprising 
has resulted in a British parliamentary report claiming the death toll so far in Darfur at 
up to 300,000. US Congress decided to tem it as “genocide”, and to demand that the 
perpetrator face justice. 51 persons are accused of war crimes”iv The above threat of 
action notwithstanding, it is evident that not much has been done by the Government of 
Sudan to stop the carnage in Darfur.v   
4. Sudanese cultural configurations and anthropological considerations: Within the 
Darfur conflict context, race and ethnicity has indeed become a force to be reckoned 
with and social scientists have increasingly been forced to address it. Sheik Ali in Kalma 
told the Technical Mission that the attackers called them ‘Toro Bora’ and they had to be 
destroyed. Within the Darfur configuration, the cultural and anthropological rationale for 
the mayhem are grounded on the ‘Arab ness’ of the Janjeweed and the ‘African ness’ of 
the Darfuris, some time crudely assaulting them as ‘Abid’ or slaves.  
5. Systematic destruction of Darfuris’ Villages: Information obtained from secondary 
sources mainly and in each case confirmed by group and individual interviews held with 
officials on the ground and the IDPs in the camps, points to a pattern of indiscriminate 
attacks on civilians in villages and communities in all three Darfur states beginning in 
early 2003. Most sources are in agreement that the escalation coincides with the 
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intensification of the internal armed conflict between the Government and the two rebel 
movements, SLM/A and JEM.vi  
6. IDP camps turned into IDP Prisons: Even though military offensives and large-scale 
displacement of civilians in all the three states of Darfur have remained low for about a 
year, violence has not ceased. Attacks have moved from villages to IDP camps.  In all 
the six camps visited by the Technical Mission three had experienced recent attacks.vii 
7. Armed robbery and abductions: bandits scour the Darfur landscape and have spread 
fear and apprehension to business, civilians and humanitarian activities.  The mandate 
and current equipment of Africa Union Military observers prohibits them from firing back 
or doing more than observing, hearing, and reporting IDP camps being raided by 
combatants on either side of the conflict. Cease-fire observer forces are not immune to 
the violence. viii 
8. Relief aid to IDPs becomes a dangerous task: channelling humanitarian assistance 
to the IDPs is a difficult task. The survival condition under which close to two million 
IDPs is unspeakably degrading and by any measure of human security, unacceptable. 
The once thriving communities of the ‘Black African’ populations have been relegated to 
sub-human conditions of life imposed by the nature of the camps and the inability of the 
IDPs to travel outside the camps for fear of rape, torture and murder. When even 
getting around to collect fire wood to cook food is as risky as a mission that would make 
one vulnerable to death, rape and torture signifies the inability of the GoS to even 
guarantee under camp conditions a minimal condition for life. Hence the IDPs will not 
survive without humanitarian assistance, including the possibilities of providing cooking 
facilities in camps. 
9. Blasphemy of spiritual and cultural idols: There have been reports of “widespread 
destruction of mosques and desecration of Muslim religious symbols, despite the Islamic 
Government of Sudan being Islamic itself”.ix Indeed, for many, it has become 
inconceivable that such violence against faith, culture and their own women can happen 
in such an organic Muslim community.  A report of desecration of a Mosque and women 
was reported to the UN International Commission of Inquiry.  
10. Small arms and light weapons: The problem of proliferation and misuse of SALW is 
acute throughout the Horn.  Wide availability and flow of SALW is partly a consequence 
of past and present wars in the Horn and in the neighbouring regions (and related third 
states providing arms to opposition / rebel groups) and is a contributing factor to the 
warlordism, militias, criminal networks, and armed crime and violence in the region. It 
also serves as an enabler of terrorism. Efforts to prevent, combat and reduce SALW 
proliferation and misuse have become a major focus for the development of national 
strategies and regional co-operation in the Horn and have for example led to agreement 
on the Nairobi Protocol amongst ten states in the Horn and East Africa.  
As seen from Table 1, the EU asserts that crucial issue in reducing instability in the Horn 
of Africa is to address the mutually reinforcing connections between insecurity, under-
development and governance. At the heart of this relationship are communities, which feel 
marginalised in the national distribution of power, wealth and access to social services, 
security and justice. The marginalisation of vulnerable groups may over time develop 
grievances that can lead to violent rebellion. Conflicts in the Horn can be exacerbated by 
powerful networks of state and non-state actors, such as warlords and the business 
community, who benefit from war economies, which they to some extent control and who 
thus have an interest in maintaining the status quo. These interests exacerbate the 
marginalisation of communities and the manipulation of ethnic solidarities. In addition the 
absence of political space for the peaceful resolution of conflicts, the authoritarianism and 
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militarism and interference by external powers have perpetuated instability and conflict in 
the Horn of Africa. 
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Table 1: Conflicts and peace process: Regional perspectives Source EU Concept paper: An EU regional political 
strategy for in the Horn of Africa 
 
III. State security and human Security  
Because the security debate has changed dramatically sine the inception of state 
security advocated in the 17th century international community urgently needs a new 
paradigm of security. According to that traditional idea, the state would monopolize the 
rights and means to protect its citizens. State power and state security would be established 
and expanded to sustain order and peace. But in the 21st century, both the challenges to 
security and its protectors have become more complex. The state remains the fundamental 
purveyor of security. Yet it often fails to fulfil its security obligations -- and at times has 
even become a source of threat to its own people. That is why attention must now shift 
from the security of the state to the security of the people to human security. Human 
security complements state security, enhances human rights, and strengthens human 
development. It seeks to protect people against a broad range of threats to individuals and 
communities and, further, to empower them to act on their own behalf. And it seeks to 
forge a global alliance to strengthen the institutional policies that link individuals and the 
state - and the state with a global world. Human security thus brings together the human 
elements of security, of rights, of development. 
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The Commission on Human Security's definition of human security: to protect the vital 
core of all human lives in ways that enhances human freedoms and human fulfilment. 
Human security means protecting fundamental freedoms - freedoms that are the essence of 
life. It means protecting people form critical (severe) and pervasive (widespread) threats 
and situations. It means using processes that build on people's strengths and aspirations. It 
means creating political, social, environmental, economic, military, and cultural system that 
together give people the building blocks of survival, livelihood and dignity. The vital core of 
life is a set of elementary rights and freedoms people enjoy. What people consider to be 
"vital" - what they consider to be "of the essence of life" and "crucially important" -- varies 
across individuals and societies. That is why any concept of human security must be 
dynamic. And that is why we refrain from proposing an itemized list of what makes up 
human security. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
As the UN Secretary-General pointed out, human security joins the main agenda items 
of peace, security, and development. Human security is comprehensive in the sense that it 
integrates these agendas:  Human security in its broadest sense embraces far more than 
the absence of violent conflict. It encompasses human rights, good governance, access to 
education and health care and ensuring that each individual has opportunities and choices 
to fulfil his or her own potential. Every step in this direction is also a step towards reducing 
poverty, achieving economic growth, and preventing conflict. Freedom from want, freedom 
from fear and the freedom of future generations to inherit a healthy natural environment - 
these are the interrelated building blocks of human and therefore national security. Human 
security also reinforces human dignity. People's horizons extend far beyond survival, to 
matters of love, culture, and faith. Protecting a core of activities and abilities is essential for 
human security must also aim at developing the capabilities of individuals and communities 
to causes and interests in many spheres of life. That is why human security starts from the 
recognition that people are the most active participants in determining their well-being. It 
builds on people's efforts, strengthening what they do for themselves. 
Human security complements "state security" in four respects: Its concern is the 
individual and the community rather than the state. Menaces to people's security include 
threats and conditions that have not always been classified as threats to state security. The 
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From conflict to Peace and Security: 
 
(1) Natural resources-based conflicts.  
(2) Potential for integration through networking.  
 
Red colours political hot spots and overlapping circles 
designate potential for trans-boundary collaboration 
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range of actors is expanded beyond the state alone. Achieving human security includes not 
just protecting people but also empowering people to fend for themselves.  States security 
focuses on other states with aggressive or adversarial designs. States built powerful security 
structures to defend themselves- their boundaries, their institutions, their values, and their 
numbers. Human security shifts from focusing on external aggression to protecting people 
from a range of menaces. State security has meant protecting territorial boundaries with - 
and from= uniformed troops. Human security also includes protection of citizens, massive 
population movements, such infectious diseases as HIV/AIDS and long-term conditions of 
oppression and deprivation. 
The range of actors is also greater. No longer are states the sole actors. Regional and 
international organisations, nongovernmental organisation (NGOs) and civil society are 
involved in managing security issues - as in the fight against HIV/AIDS, the ban against 
landmines and the massive mobilisations in support of human rights. Securing people also 
entails empowering people and societies. In many situations, people can contribute directly 
to identifying and implementing solutions to the quagmire of insecurity. In post-conflict 
situations, for example, bringing diverse constituents together to rebuild their communities 
can solve security problems. Human security and state security are mutually reinforcing and 
dependent on each other. Without human security, state security cannot be attained and 
vice versa. Human security requires strong and stable institutions. Whereas state security is 
focused, human security is broad.  
 In summary, human security is to protect the vital core of all human lives in ways that 
enhances human freedoms and human fulfilment. It means protecting fundamental 
freedoms that are the essence of life. It means protecting people form critical (severe) and 
pervasive (widespread) threats and situations. It means using processes that build on 
people's strengths and aspirations. It means creating political, social, environmental, 
economic, military, and cultural system that together give people the building blocks of 
survival, livelihood and dignity. 
 The Consultations on a Strategy for Peace and Security in the The Greater Horn of Africa 
Region Opening Conference, Khartoum, Sudan 1-3 October, 2005 underpinned the concern 
to promote peace and stability in the region has been a core concern of IGAD since the early 
1990’s, and was reflected in active and continuous engagement with the peace processes in 
Sudan and Somalia from that period.  
 A carefully selected group of specialists, officials and activists were invited to the 
conference reeprsnting stakeholders and representatives of civil society, governments and 
activists. A number of background papers covering the key issues touching on peace and 
security in the region have been circulated and discussed in the conference, which 
represented a pivotal part of the consultation process as well as offering concrete proposals 
for the strategy. In particular, the conference identifed thematic topics for the series of 
workshops planned as part of the consultation strategy, work to create a constituency that 
advocates for the strategy and help in formulating the strategy. 
 The Conference issues to be discussed included inter alia reflecting on the “identity” and 
orientation of IGAD as a regional body, and the extent to which members identify with and 
commit to it, and how this commitment is affected by overlapping membership in other 
organisations; reviewing IGAD’s role in the area of conflict management and resolution and 
the consensus among members about approaches to peace and security issues; focusing on 
a human security approach which ensures that the security of states should not conflict with 
the security of its citizens, and examining ways of continuing and public citizenship 
involvement in and monitoring of the regional security agenda both within states and on the 
interstate level; looking at the issues of poverty, HIV/AIDS and their impact on regional 
security and governance; discussing the question of terrorism and the proliferation of 
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militias, militarised societies, flow of arms and organized crime and impact on security; 
lessons on existing peace and development initiative that worked; undertaking a 
comprehensive assessment of the present situation in the region, including an analysis of 
the causes or potential causes of conflict, and ways of dealing with them; reflecting on the 
lessons of regional successes and how to learn from them and to build on them; exploring 
ways for engaging the power and security elites in the region in open discussion with 
relevant stakeholders on the security agenda. 
 This drive coincided with, and contributed to, the new dynamic in pan-African peace 
building and promotion, which culminated in the establishment of the African Union. The AU 
is currently actively engaged in dealing with the continent’s challenges and developing new 
African institutions, including the creation of the AU Peace and Security Council, the 
formation of the African Standby Forces and the development of a new pan-African peace 
strategy. Procedures and an agreed division of labour with AU, UN agencies and NEPAD 
need to be worked out on the basis of past experiences in the sub-region and elsewhere. To 
cope with all these developments and challenges, and to fully realise peace building and 
promotion potential, there is a consensus on the need for a new comprehensive and viable 
strategy for peace and security in the region, a realisation already made clear by the 2001 a 
study on “Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution: Capacity Assessment Study for 
the IGAD Sub-region”, carried out by Leeds University for IGAD with assistance from the 
EU. A key recommendation of the study was the elaboration of a strategy and a mechanism 
for conflict early warning and to enhance the regional CEWARN, set up in 2000, with the 
current focus on pastoral boarder conflicts. 
III. State security - underlying causes of conflicts and security architecture  
 Longer term underlying reasons for insecurity include poverty, and thus conflict over 
scarce resources, vulnerability to external economic shocks, weak institutions (further 
weakened by HIV/AIDS), and poor governance. However, under militarised governance and 
with mostly short-term thinking, these are often not seen as `national security' issues at all 
and are considered a lower priority than military and security affairs. Or if they are considered 
national security issues, the response is to prepare for any military threats that may transpire, 
rather than addressing the underlying causes themselves. Some national security issues, such as 
the level of HIV/AIDS in the officer corps of the army, may simply remain secret. Underpinning 
these weaknesses is the absence of a clear strategy for promoting long-term national security in 
most countries. Countries that have identified their national security threats, and developed clear 
and transparent mechanisms for responding to them, are more stable and predictable. In 
addition, as countries move towards a correct identification of their national security 
challenges, they identify a wider range of threats, many of them longer-term ones that need to 
be dealt with by non-military means. Threats to national security, real and potential, include, 
among others:  
1. Actual and potential external threats of force projection (invasion);  
2. External threats of destabilisation and terrorism;  
3. Potential sources of conflict with neighbours such as un-demarcated borders,  
4. Contested natural resource control;  
5. Violent crime and banditry associated with proliferation of light weapons;  
6. Potential social unrest associated with economic recession;  
7. Ethnic, religious and regional cleavages and the incapacity of governance 
structures to manage disputes peacefully;  
8. Insufficiently institutionalised constitutional order;  
9. Weak governance institutions and corruption;  
10. Mass distress migration due to natural and man-made calamities; and  
11. HIV/AIDS and its impact on institutions including security services. 
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 As we move down this list we shift from immediate military threats to structural problems 
confronting African governments. In the longer term, it is these structural problems that are 
most likely to cause major problems. Addressing these requires an agenda that overlaps with 
establishing the AU and promoting good governance and economic development as 
envisioned by NEPAD. In the long term, security is best guaranteed by democratic, accountable 
and stable governments presiding over sustainable development. A far-reaching agenda of 
security sector reform, ensuring civilian control of the military and similar measures, will 
help to deliver these gains. A highly significant start has been made with a succession of 
resolutions by the OAU and AU to refuse to recognise forcible and unconstitutional transfers 
of power. The fact that the Constitutive Act of the AU precludes as a member any government 
that take's power by unconstitutional means is a powerful signal. The next stage in this process 
is deepening constitutionalism in member states, adopting common and ever-higher 
standards for democracy and the rule of law for African countries. 
 At present, the main question is, can Africa's existing intergovernmental institutions play a 
leading role in promoting a security community (or communities) in the continent? The obstacles 
they face are formidable. For a start, not only are the problems severe and complex, but also 
the institutions are weak. While ASEAN benefited from strong, stable states, and Europe had 
both capable states and strong inter-governmental institutions, Africa has neither. Moreover, 
while Europe and southeast Asia benefited from states with strong political interests in making 
regional institutions work, the same does not necessarily hold in Africa. Across the continent, 
states retain vested interests in international organisations not developing sufficient autonomy 
to exercise real influence. Many governments, both African and non-African, prefer to bypass 
regional and sub regional organisations, and even sometimes undermine their efforts. Most 
African governments are also possessive of their sovereign privileges, and are thus averse 
both to surrendering any powers and to the implications of `variable geometry' approaches to 
inter-state activities. 
 There is no single strategy that can provide peace and security to GHA. Strategies should 
focus on the different stages of conflict, namely conflict prevention and peace building, conflict 
resolution and containment, and post-conflict reconstruction. Strategies also need to be 
undertaken simultaneously at local, civil society, national and regional levels, in the social, 
political, military and economic spheres. Strategies need to be simultaneously `objective', dealing 
with the substantive issues and the institutional mechanisms for responding, and `subjective', in 
developing the awareness, understanding and expectations of leaders at all levels. They need to 
move beyond purely military definitions of security to more comprehensive and strategic 
visions. 
IV. Human security and alternative intra-party conflict management (ACM):   
Conflict theories, be it Marxian or Freudian, see conflict as a necessary force to reduce 
tension between individuals and groups who are naturally seen as having different needs 
and interests. Hence conflict often serves as an important impetus for positive change. 
Nonetheless, conflicts can and do cause major societal destabilization and hence the need a 
multidisciplinary ACM approach and a variety of collaborative strategies that seek to bring 
Ethiopia’s political groups to agree to process, strategies, structures and systems for ACM is 
timely. The first strategic move is choosing the correct strategy through which to address a 
particular conflict, where contending parties to a dispute first decide whether to seek 
resolution to a conflict through a non-consensual process or through a more collaborative 
means. The CM process employed so far consist of attempts by neutral third parties to 
communicate separately with disputing parties for the purpose of reducing tensions and 
agreeing on a process for addressing a process in which parties meet face to face to reach a 
mutually acceptable resolution of the issues.  
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 In the following, we present the protocols necessary to arrive at meaningful resolution. 
Many factors have been found to be helpful in analysing a conflict, to decide whether it 
could be addressed through the ACM approach. If careful analysis suggests that a dispute 
could be negotiated or mediated, these same factors are important in determining the 
structure and conduct of the dispute resolution process. The following table establishes the 
issues that the political groups can bring to the table  
Query Issue ‘REBELS’/OPPOSITION GOVERNMENT 
What would the 
party do if it does 
not negotiate?  
Demand civil disobedience 
and launch the nation into 
unprecedented crisis 
Stay in power but invite civil 
disobedience that wreck havoc in 
the nation 
Could it successfully 
bring a lawsuit or 
lobby politically to 
get what it wants?  
It believes it can hardly get 
any ruling from the courts 
as its dominated by ruling 
party appointees 
It can be expected to have fair 
hearing as the justice is appointed 
by the same and the Supreme 
Court Justice was also the head of 
election board 
Does it have any 
reasonable position 
at all?  
It says it does, but there 
are lingering question on 
the sincerity of the 
membership  
It has claimed that it has won the 
elections and will form the 
government  
(a) What is the 
party's best 
alternatives o a 
negotiated 
agreement?  
What are the costs 
and benefits of 
each? 
Settlement will enhance its 
capacity to stay in politics & 
win more seats  
Disagreeing with the opposition 
may cost it as it can turn into a 
crisis nation-wide 
Bottom line 
A party should not enter into a conflict management process if it believes that it can do 
better, overall, through other means. Conversely, protagonists entering into negotiations 
with strong positions enter with an important source of negotiating power. 
 
What are the "rules of the game"? As determined by the election board and observers 
Who will participate? Will one 
party underwrite less well-
financed individual candidates? 
As coalition of many parties they have their hands 
full already 
It should be able to sponsor finance smaller parties 
and individual candidates  
Order of issues to be addressed? Elections, election, elections, elections 
(b) How should 
the process of 
reaching an 
agreement be 
structured?  
Do they want to reach a decision? It is expected they should in their own interest  
Strategic concerns 
 In the process of employing ACM strategies, participants generally make a series of 
rapid decisions, more often than not with limited information. Understanding and applying 
these key ideas will assist a political party in deciding, first, whether to enter into a 
negotiation, mediation or conciliation, and second, how to engage more successfully. 
 
Election  Winning the election 
(c) What are the 
basic interests of 
each of the 
parties? 
A careful and sophisticated analysis of each party's interests can, first of all, clarify the 
extent to which one party needs the others to achieve what it wants. If one party 
depends on the others to achieve its goals, then negotiation may be needed. In addition, 
an analysis of each party's interests can help point out which groups have common or 
competing agenda. 
 
Contested seats  Clarifying the impasse 
Political parties in Ethiopia enter into negotiations with only one solution in mind - they 
have identified the positions they wish to take rather than the interests that they wish to 
defend. This can quickly lead to an impasse. A political party will be in a stronger 
negotiating position if, after analyzing its interests, it develops a range of options for 
satisfying them. This implies being flexible about the way in which basic interests are 
satisfied -- not about whether they should be satisfied. 
Convergence of ideas Winning the agenda 
All too often, parties to a negotiation believe that the discussions must be entirely 
competitive, and fall into communication patterns characterized by mutually aggressive 
behaviour. In fact, competition can be balanced with cooperation over some aspect of 
virtually any negotiation -- without either party making unacceptable concessions. 
(d) What are 
options that could 
be presented at 
the negotiation 
table? How can 
competition be 
balanced with 
some degree of 
cooperation? Can 
implementation of 
an agreement be 
ensured? 
Convergence of agency Winning the agency 
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 The implementation of agreements needs to be discussed from the early stages of a 
dispute resolution process, rather than being left to the end. Important topics that need 
to be addressed include technical feasibility, political viability, financial requirements and 
mechanisms for ensuring compliance by all sides. 
 
CEWARN has an important function in a region that greeted the new millennium with 
more conflicts; while still haunted by poor and rapidly increasing subsistence population, 
environmental crises, shattered infrastructure and a history of natural and man-made 
disasters. It is also a time of new claims on relief and development assistance. Moreover, 
states and civil societies in the region have insufficient capacity and inadequate networks to 
develop responses to the challenges to human security. The business plan will hence focus 
on systems approach for policy analysis, formulation and management, strategic 
reassessment, participatory processes thrusts, and structural/ functional imperatives. Key 
concepts that influence these systems tools are 
− Human Security, which is about protecting people's security and requires of CEWARN to identify 
and prepare for menaces that have severe consequences. What defines a menace to human 
security is its depth, its swift onset and pervasiveness. These menaces must be identified and 
prioritised in an empowering way using the rights-based approach.  
− Capacity building, which does not only mean that those with skills will build the capacity of those 
without skills. Civil society-augured participatory EW/CM vastly augurs deep on local knowledge. 
Hence, the overall aim of capacity building is to get stakeholders more focused on taking charge of 
their own situations and working towards changing their own conditions.  
− CEWARN-system governance regimes, development of communities of practice, civil society 
engagement, engendering CEWARN, learning and knowledge management, internal research 
capability, internal and external resources mobilization and mainstreaming and integration 
 
 
V. Recommendations 
 Within democratic political governance, we must provide services of strengthening 
democratic governing institutions (parliaments, elections, judiciary), promoting human 
rights, supporting decentralization and local governance, building capacities of civil society, 
advising in public sector management (civil service reform, anti-corruption and aid 
harmonization) and facilitating governance in pre-crisis and post-conflict countries. 
1. Strengthening democratic and human rights institutions: Democratic and 
governing institutions include legislatures, legal and judicial systems and electoral 
bodies. Legislatures (parliaments) mediate differing interests and debate and establish 
policies, laws and resource priorities that directly affect the political environment and 
encourage and support sustainable human development. Electoral bodies and processes 
ensure independent and transparent national and local elections, ultimately securing 
political legitimacy. Independent judiciaries uphold the rule of law, bringing security and 
predictability to social, political and economic relations and assuring the protection of 
human rights. The respect for the rights of people is the foundation of sustainable 
human development. Good governance requires respect for human rights - freedom 
from discrimination and violence, equal opportunity, due process, freedom of expression 
and organization, and transparent, accountable state. These rights include not only 
political and civil rights but also the right to development. Other include decentralization 
and building local governance, strengthening civil society, public sector management, 
civil service reform and anti-corruption and conflict management processes and 
preventive diplomacy, good governance and human rights 
2. Humility and Optimism: State policy makers must express their humility, optimism, 
ethics and recognition of shared responsibility -- that justice is worth striving for and, 
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therefore, the understanding of participation must embody the right to citizenship; a 
recognition for people to participate in national and community development with 
passion. The State and legitimate structures of civil society must build on those ideals; 
deploy them to address the need for management of a more equitable system that 
would allow the continents vulnerable groups to take control their own future.  
3. Macroeconomic Prudence: States must marshal their resources toward alleviating the 
effects of our vulnerabilities. They must ensure policy coherence that all initiatives are 
made to have a sense of direction. Structural adjustments, policies for poverty 
alleviation, trade agreements, the debt threat, international aid and financing, peace and 
security, destitution safety nets, human rights, production relations and the organization 
of the productive forces must all be designed as mutually supportive elements in their 
implementation.  
4. Trans-national relations and integration: according to the EU, “attention shall be 
devoted to reforming border-controls and trade tariff-regimes in the region to facilitate 
and encourage cross-border trade and development and removing some existing 
incentives for illicit trafficking and corruption. This could include bilateral initiatives to 
enhance the monitoring of borders such as the Ethiopia and Eritrea military coordination 
commission, the border Commission between Djibouti and Eritrea or joint training 
programmes for customs services. IGAD’s counter terrorism programme could 
specifically focus on this area. Increasing the capacity and political commitment of the 
AU, IGAD and other sub-regional organisations to play a key role in regional stabilisation 
is a high priority in the regional framework”. Prioritising current strategic country level 
issues with a view of taking into account the regional dimension in political dialogue; 
tackling regional cross-cutting and cross-border issues; strengthening the capacity of 
the AU and sub-regional organisations to respond to and prevent crises and to promote 
economic cooperation and integration; several actions are already being undertaken and 
there are proposals to further review priorities and existing actions within the regional 
strategy.  
5. The right to humanness, survival and development: It is a fundamental premise of 
people-centred development that people have certain basic and universal human rights 
as defined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of the United Nations. 
Furthermore it is a fundamental responsibility of every state to respect and protect these 
rights.x 
6. Voluntary action as a human right: Voluntary action, the sine qua non for 
development and preventive diplomacy among communities, is an expression of both a 
basic human right and a civic responsibility to participate actively in the life of the 
community. Indeed, voluntary action is one of the highest forms of citizenship as it 
represents action in the service of the community without expectation or pursuit of 
personal economic or political gain. Voluntary action may be either individual or 
collective. Collective action may range from purely informal temporary forms of 
cooperation to large corporate organizations with professional staff and significant 
assets. People's organizations as legal organizational entitles are one vehicle for the 
expression of voluntary action. Our immediate concern is primarily with organized 
action, but the same basic principles relate to individual voluntary action as well. The 
exercise of a basic right that resides with the individual requires no permission from any 
state. Nor does the intention or act of require public notification.  
7. Conflict management and trans-boundary resources management: Peoples in the 
Horn share common and open access properties and resources in the borders that is 
fundamental to their survival. Nevertheless, within our lifetime we have witnessed major 
conflict between clans and tribes in the Greater Horn and outright wars between 
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countries – Ethiopia and Somalia, Eritrea and Ethiopia, DRC and Uganda, Rwanda and 
Uganda, Tanzania and Uganda, DRC and Rwanda…. These have curtailed development 
efforts in the region.  More than that, development efforts in The Horn over recent 
decades have been frustrated by the complicated and multifaceted nature of the 
expected processes of change; and because of a number of inherent contradictions 
among the various issues and actors and their differing perspectives. In order to 
understand the specific constraints and opportunities of the natural resource 
management sector, analysis of the contradictions can be useful for understanding the 
context and issues, and for defining opportunities for constructive action. xi 
8. The African renaissance- conceptualization of African unification and dividends to the 
Horn: We have underpinned that the 21st Century has ushered in a time of 
unprecedented global wealth and extraordinary opportunities; but Africa has yet to 
benefit from this. In this globalization of prosperity and plenty, an important dimension 
that features prominently in the Africa discourse is the relative contribution and weight 
of international trade and mechanisms for democratic development.xii The question is 
how does the continent go about to bring that change? Here we need to identify a 
political design and governance methodology using various strands of the literature on 
political change, and suggests that democratic development derives from three distinct 
sets of factors. xiii 
 
VI. Conclusion and recommendations on Darfur 
 The need for the fundamental change on how the global community deals with the 
internecine crises must change. It must encourage appropriate action for promoting and 
managing an enabling environment for mainstreaming peace, security a developmental 
response in the drive for human development and popular participation – people acting as 
citizens of a political society, reinforcing ownership and ensuring continuity. We advocate for 
the development of think tanks that would set the stage for the paradigmatic development 
of internal models of growth and human welfare. To every human problem there is always a 
solution that is smart, simple and immoral. We tend to have a linear way of thinking that is 
inadequate to unravel the many complex inter-relationships underlying people’s peace and 
insecurity. It is neither popular nor scientific. 
 Women’s empowerment is important in human security, human rights and peace 
building because women develop their potential as individuals and as communities. 
Strengthening their abilities to act on their own behalf is also instrumental to human 
security. Women empowered can demand respect for their dignity when it is violated. They 
can create new opportunities for work and address many problems locally.xiv Supporting 
their ability to act on their own behalf means providing education and information so that 
they can scrutinise social arrangements and take collective action.  It means building a 
public space encourages local leadership and cultivates public discussion. It is in this belief 
that the UN Security Council resolution 1325 “Calls upon all parties to armed conflict to 
respect fully international law applicable to the rights and protection of women and girls, 
especially as civilians”.  
 The achievements of AMIS and the humanitarian community in Darfur so far are 
impressive: While media and international human rights reports put the death toll of 
Darfuris at anywhere between 50,000 – 300,000; the fact remains that such mass murder 
has been controlled by the monitoring action of AMIS. The contribution of the hundreds of 
humanitarian organisations to providing direly needed relief and sustenance support have 
saved the lives of close to two million Darfuri; who would be without food, water, shelter 
and health assistance in this punishing desert environment. The Darfur humanitarian 
operation is one of the largest operations in a single location so far in the continent.  Our 
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recommendations here are designed to reinforce such worthy actions and highlight the 
urgency of halting gender-based violence and provide relief and post-conflict reconstruction 
to the Darfuri IDPs and refugees. 
1) Recommendation for the GoS: the GoS bears the primary responsibility to resolve the 
unprecedented human impasse in the most humane way. Towards this end the GoS 
must immediately and unconditionally put a halt to the heinous crimes committed in 
Darfur on all Darfuris and especially Darfuri women that are being atrociously abused 
by the armed militia; allegedly with the support of its police and military forces. The 
perpetrators of the murder, rape and violence must with out delay to the ICC.  The GoS 
must guarantee gender-based human security in Darfur at all levels. The human 
security package must include relief aid to the needy including food, fuel, and shelter; 
emergency health support to the weak and meek; competent policing of the Darfuri 
villages with a heightened community-based security; and reinstatement of the spiritual 
and cultural symbols of the Darfuri. The GoS must organise gender sensitive post-
conflict recovery and rehabilitation packages for the Darfuri IDPs to go back to 
their villages and start life again. Wherever the village have been taken over (settled) by 
the armed militia, these villages must be returned immediately to the lawful owners. The 
GoS must rethink its justice systems in Darfur: over and over again the IDPs refer 
to the collapse of the GoS police and justice system.  To complicate the misery of 
women further the Sharia Law has unfettered power over the justice system. Women 
could barely get there, as they are systematically discouraged from appealing to the rule 
of the law. There is an urgent need for the GoS to revisit this and attend quickly to all 
cases that have been referred to the courts. The deployment a professional police force 
in Darfur will go a long way in providing peace dividends to the GoS and Darfuris.    
2) Recommendations for the AU: the AU through the various organs it has established 
in Darfur has undertaken the task of monitoring the cease fire and peace, providing 
security and protection to humanitarian missions, and through the Abuja Peace Talks, 
finding lasting solutions for the problem. Towards this end it must ensure human 
security, enhancing the size of its force, recruit more CIVPOL women officers, 
and develop capacity for multi-track communications in terms of advocacy, social 
marketing, negotiation with communities and public relations. Given the wide spread 
abuses against women, the potential such communications systems have in curbing 
impunity is indeed feasible. 
3) Recommendations for the GoS and Humanitarian Organisations:  the task of 
humanitarian organisations (NNGOs, INGOs, UN, and Human Right Groups) is to provide 
relief, psychosocial trauma management and PCR. The GoS, UN and NGOs must 
deliver gender-sensitive relief, protection and development services at all levels 
so that the Darfuris can continue to lead their lives at several levels of human security 
packages that must per force include relief aid to the needy including food, fuel, and 
shelter could be delivered within the framework of emergency aid and long-term 
development programmes. Agencies must use the rights-based approach to supporting 
communities to ensure less dependence on their programmes. Human rights groups 
must continue to collect, collate, analyse and document information that can and must 
be communicated to the GoS, AU, UN and other stakeholders to ensure that all forms of 
violence reported and acted upon.  
Gender mainstreaming: the GoS in cooperation with the AMIS, humanitarian 
organisations can engage government sectors, NGOs, private sector entities, faith 
organisations, etc., that can both meet the needs of their own environment, as well as 
apply their comparative advantage to support specific aspects of governance, gender, 
HIV/AIDS, and rights. Mainstreaming provides a mechanism through which multi-
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sectoral strategies can be analysed and acted upon, within clear areas of responsibility, 
building up multi-level yet coherent interventions at all levels.  
Women’s participation in peace and conceptions of citizenship in the 21 
Century: Women’s participation in peace making and peace building as citizens of a 
political society is an important concept in the late twentieth century. Hence we 
recommend that the GoS, AU, UN, bilaterals and multilaterals, NNGOS, INGOs and 
foundations and trusts to undertake women’s citizenship sensitisation, awareness 
and education: It is the fundamental recommendation of this report that citizenship 
education - learning about and appreciating one's rights, duties, obligations and 
responsibilities as a citizen and the immediate rules, laws and governance structures 
within which women exercise citizenship is the first and fundamental step in peace 
building. The civic education programme must underpin the fact that women’s 
collective action is an expression of both a basic human right and a civic 
responsibility to participate actively in the life of the community. Indeed, women’s 
citizen action is one of the highest forms of citizenship as it represents action in the 
service of the community without expectation or pursuit of personal economic or political 
gain.xv 
Agency and rape and assault on women: Participants in and around projects of GBV 
generally constitute a network or intersection of institutions and groups. The one 
important agency missing in all these is a Darfur women’s organisations in Darfur; 
thereby denying women IDPs with agency to represent their interest, aspirations and 
make known their fears and vulnerabilities.  
Gender Focussed Alternative Conflict Management (GFACM): it is recommended 
that GFACM, a multi-disciplinary field of research and action that portends and seeks to 
address the question of how women and men can make better decisions together, 
particularly on difficult, contentious issues. GFACM refers to a variety of collaborative 
approached that seek to reach a mutually acceptable resolution of issues in a conflict 
through a voluntary pro. Such approached were developed as alternatives to adversarial 
or non-consensual strategies, such as judicial or legal recourse, unilaterally initiated 
public information campaigns, or partisan political action. A three-day workshop can be 
held with Darfuri IDP women, sheiks, GoS, CFC and the international community to 
enable the return of IDPs to their villages with all human security conditions fulfilled.   
Leadership training and mentoring/apprenticeship - leadership gives agency 
for women: the capacity to effect change. But leadership is constrained by structures, 
including the wider economic and political environment in which the leader operates, and 
the nature of his or her constituency and Organisation. An understanding of both 
leader's agency and structure is necessary: each determines the other.  
Organisation or movement for social progress or emancipation: This concept 
encompasses Darfuri women grassroots organisations, CSOs, and other forms of social 
organisation that involve the voluntary association of individuals. This is, self-evidently, 
a movement to remedy the GBV and bring about social change for the better. It is the 
practical manifestation of the impulse for social change or emancipation, the popular 
counterpart man of leadership. 
HIV/AIDS and IDPs:  Sexual abuse and violence—much, but not all of it directed 
against females—are serious problems that transcend economic, social, ethnic and 
geographical lines in the Darfuri IDP and refugee camps. Women IDPs and refugees – 
and in particular young women – are especially vulnerable to HIV infection, being unable 
to avoid coercive sexual relations. Darfuri communities in particular are also vulnerable 
because of lower levels of literacy and less access to information and services. Hence we 
recommend that urgent social policy specifically tailored to Darfur and Darfuris is 
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essential to provide a conceptual framework for vulnerability reduction and to develop 
strategic responses and empowerment of women to negotiate safe sex, programmes for 
high risk and non-high risk youth population, women and workplace programmes, care 
and support for PLWHA and PABA and treatment 
4) Recommendations for the UN Security Council: pursuant to paragraphs 6, 13 and 
16 of Security Council resolution 1556 (2004) of 30 July 2004, paragraph 15 of Council 
resolution 1564 (2004) of 18 September 2004, paragraph 17 of Council 1574 (2004) of 
19 November 2004 and paragraph 12 of Council resolution 1590 (2005) of 24 March 
2005; the UN Security Council through the good offices of the UN SG must continue to 
monitor the human condition in Darfur and provide recommendations for actions on 
human security and human development to binding in its resolution both to the 
Sudanese government and the combatants.  
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Annex One 
META-ASSUMPTIONS TO BE TESTED AND INDICATORS  
TO BE USED IN THE PEACE AND SECURITY STRATEGY AND MECHANISM 
DEVELOPMENT PROCESS 
 
1) Rule of Law: legal protection of constitutionally defined rights; independent 
judiciary, with a range of legal expertise; there is a functioning court system, staffed 
by trained professionals; a system of civil security and a professional police force 
exist; people are generally informed of their rights and have access to the legal 
system; enforcement of contracts by the courts immune to political interference; all 
budgets and public expenditures made public; all government expenditures are 
audited, and audit reports made public; there is an independent auditor general's 
office, staffed with trained professionals; there are legal and regulatory frameworks 
to control corruption and rent seeking; all revenues accruing to the government or 
the central bank entered into official accounts? 
2) Military and Security policies and strategies: the military is independent of the 
political parties; the military and security forces are under civilian control; the 
military does not decide on national security issues; military budgets are not 
proportionally more than human development budgets; nations have a security 
strategy and policy and composition of the military vis-à-vis ethnicity, religion, 
political affiliation?  
3) Administrative and bureaucratic consistency: Is there a civil service, with 
appointments based on merit? Are governmental officials subject to the rule of law? 
Is the compensation for civil servants comparable to that of other sectors? Is civil 
service career development independent of the executive branch or political party in 
power?  
4) Political openness and tolerance: Are political parties allowed to exist legally and 
constitutionally? Is there constitutional and legal provision for freedom of speech, 
media, assembly and association? Is there an elected legislature, which is 
responsible to the electorate? Does the legislature have oversight over governmental 
policy? Do opposition groups have legitimacy, and do they play a role in the political 
process? 
5) Participation and communication: there are ranges of countervailing 
intermediary civic organisations that function freely and openly, legislative decisions 
made public, processes for popular participation exist; Are non-governmental 
organisations financially and operationally independent of the government? Are non-
governmental organisations and institutions legally allowed to exist and free from 
governmental control? 
6) Favourable environment for private enterprise: Is there constitutional and legal 
provision for private ownership of property? Is there constitutional and legal 
provision for private investment? Are there political conditions on access to credit? Is 
the banking system's ability to support private investment curtailed by governmental 
regulations? Are regulations governing investment, and import and export 
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procedures clear and easy to understand? Is the implementation of government 
regulations and licensing procedures slow and complicated? 
7) There is a civil service, with appointments based on merit: there is a civil 
service with minimum entry requirements, or are large sectors of the population 
guaranteed a job in the public sector; there is a clear system of promotion based on 
merit, with checks and balances to ensure that this is implemented, or is it assumed 
that promotion is based on other factors; specific functions are clearly described, and 
chains of command clearly delineated; there are widespread recorded or known 
instances of promotion or appointment because of patronage or corruption; There 
are regulations prohibiting acceptance of bribes or kickbacks. Such regulations are 
enforced or are they widely circumvented; There recorded instances or public 
officials being brought to trial for misconduct; There are widely known instances of 
officials being guilty of law breaking but not being prosecuted 
8) There is an elected legislature which is responsible to the electorate and has 
oversight over governmental policy: freedoms defined by laws are broadly 
permitted, special permissions required before such freedoms can be implemented; 
there is an independent press and media; there is no governmental censorship of the 
press, press freedom is not curtailed due to fear of governmental redress; 
Legislature elected by open ballot and understands its role, Systems in place 
whereby public opinion can be made known; Executive branch can implement 
decisions without legislative approval; Members of the legislature have sufficient 
access to information and technical resources to enable them to make informed 
decisions, for example, a research service or library available and do they have 
technical staff; Legislature responsible for drafting legislation, does it approve 
legislation drafted by the executive branch, or does it do both 
9) There are robust civic organisations: The non-governmental sector well 
developed, with organisations serving a variety of sectors of the population, rural as 
well as urban; There are organisations which function as political pressure groups or 
which lobby for specific interests; Labour unions and professional associations exist 
and do they promote the rights of their members; Independent institutions such as 
policy or political and economic think tanks exist; most CSOs have independent 
boards of directors, and operate according to a constitution or other set o binding 
principles; legislation permitting CSOs to earn revenue, collect membership 
contributions, or receive donations from the public or local or foreign institutions 
exist; most CSOs self- financing; CSOs legally allowed to exist, and are there any 
restrictions placed upon them; There are known or recorded instances of 
governmental interference with non- governmental organisations and CSOs act as 
intermediaries between the government and their members  
10) CSOs are independent of the government: There are established and recognised 
ways and means for the public to voice concern or express opinion to policy makers; 
Are such things as opinion polls or attitude surveys undertaken; There are means by 
which communities can express their development priorities at the local level; Are 
local government officials elected; NGOs receive subsidies from the government  
11) There is constitutional and legal provision for private investment: Is 
legislation conductive to the private ownership of property, or does it make it difficult 
and only possible in certain circumstances; Is private ownership of both property and 
land for any purposes allowed, and can such property and land be sold or otherwise 
passed on by the owners; There are property and land ownership records which can 
be publicly consulted; Do the regulations and administrative procedures which need 
to be followed facilitate or impede private ownership of property and land; Is 
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provision made in the constitution for private investment, and does legislation 
conducive to private investment exist; Is private investment permitted in all sectors, 
or is it controlled; Is the regulatory environment conducive to small scale business, 
the informal sector and women entrepreneurs, or does it in effect discriminate 
against them; Is information about investment options easily available and is the tax 
structure conducive to small scale private investment 
12) There are political conditions on access to credit: Is the amount of money 
available for credit controlled by the government; Are the restrictions on credit 
eligibility such that only a small percentage of the population qualifies; Is credit 
generally available, to both men and women, in rural as well as urban areas through 
a variety of mechanisms, or is it restricted; There are governmental restrictions on 
what credit can be provided for; There is a functioning banking system; Is the 
banking system subject to arbitrary political manipulation; There are governmental 
restrictions on lending for private sector investment or purchase of property or land; 
Do government regulations on interest rates or tax on private deposits exist, and do 
they negatively affect private sector activity; Are the regulations uniformly enforced, 
or are there known or recorded instances of their being waived in certain instances;  
13) Implementation of regulations and licensing procedures: There is a facility for 
"one stop" procurement of licenses or other required documents, or is it necessary to 
visit a variety of different departments or offices; Are officials generally familiar with 
regulations, and able to expedite the process, or are they uninformed and need to 
seek guidance on a case-by case basis; There are known or recorded instances of 
bribes or other payment being required to obtain licenses or other documents, even 
though regulatory procedures have all been followed; Is it possible to obtain licenses 
or other documents within a relatively short time frame, or does it take a long time 
and require repeat visits by the person applying for the license;  
14) All government expenditures are on budget ensuring public accountability: 
There is a central, comprehensive budget, which is includes all governmental 
expenditure, or are some sectors "off- budget"; government budgets and 
expenditure reports publicly available; expenditure reports consistent with budgets in 
terms of budget line-items; expenditure reports disaggregated by sector and 
geographic region; the government has access to sufficient funds for which it does 
not require legislative oversight to undermine public accountability; there are 
recorded or known instances of such funds being used to buy support for the 
government, or finance the party in power; There are known or recorded instances 
of government officials using such funds for personal profit  
15) There is decentralisation of resource generation and allocation: all 
government departments and ministries develop their own budgets based on 
analysis of need, or are they allocated a fixed amount to programme; government 
ministries and departments have a chance to argue for additional resources, or 
influence the way funds are allocated; There are opportunities for government 
ministries or departments to generate their own resources, for example through user 
fees; There are incentives for government ministries and departments to develop 
more cost efficient ways of doing business, or if they save money is it taken away 
from them for re-distribution to other sectors; are provincial and local authorities 
able to collect revenue and program if for their own use, or are all revenues passed 
to the central government; local authorities develop their own budgets, or are local 
budgets centrally planned and funds allocated; can local authorities develop their 
own budgetary priorities and program funds; local government budgets, revenues 
and expenditures are subject to audit;  
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Notes and references 
                                                 
i The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda recognised rape as a crime of genocide for the first time in 1998. Smith, J. 
Walker, B (2004) Darfur: Management of a Genocidal Crisis Summary report Nov.  Report No. S01/04 
ii Reeves, E (2004) “Darfur Mortality Update” http://www.sepnet.org/index.php?op=ViewArticle&articleId=334&blogId=1 in 
Smith, J. Walker, B (2004) Darfur: Management of a Genocidal Crisis Summary report November 2004 Report No. S01/04 
iii Adam Jones (2004). A compendium of media coverage and human rights reportage about gender-selective killings of men 
and boys in Darfur, Sudan, http://gendercide.org/darfur01.htm, [Accessed 11October 2004]. Summary report 
iv http://www.economist.com/agenda/displaystory.cfm?story_id=3829702.  
v In the fortnight the Technical Mission spent in Sudan and the fortnight before; fatal attacks resulting in killings and maiming 
of the civilian population in the camps, AMIS personnel and staff of humanitarian agencies were carried out with deadly precision. 
The perpetrators in all these cases were reportedly a wide spectrum ranging from the Government of Sudan army and the Janjaweed 
(Tawilla camp), SLA rebels (Nyala) and JEM rebels (Tine). The killing of 4 Nigerian peace keepers and two civilian staff on the day 
the Technical Mission visited Nyala at the hands of a reported renegade SLA commander was particularly shocking only to be 
followed by the abduction of 18 AMIS military observers and their vehicles in Tine Western Darfur. On 18 September 2005, 
simultaneous attacks at Khartoum Djadeed, Sandego, Khasantongur, Tary, Martal and Djabain resulted in the death of 12 civilians, 5 
seriously wounded, and the displacement of about 4,000 civilians.  Heavy and small weapons mounted on vehicles were reportedly 
used by GOS, in close coordination with about 300 Janjaweed. Most of the displaced people moved to Zam Zam and Tawilla IDP 
camps. The press statement of the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission reveals there are 
violation of the ceasefire by all parties concerned and wanton killing of civilians in attacks reportedly by the Government of Sudan 
forces and the armed militia.   
vi The Technical Mission witnessed a burnt village and a slide show was presented to it by the AMIS on the killings of several 
men in Tawilla Camp.  The village has been burnt down completely and the IDPs have taken to the mountains for protection. Such 
attacks are evidently well planned and executed with ‘military discipline’.  Reports and interviews carried out with IDPs all pointed 
to the fact that in some of the attacks there were both aerial bombardments by the Sudanese Air Force and ground attacks by 
Janjaweed militia and government of Sudan soldiers. In all cases the Janjaweed militia were reportedly riding horses and camels 
while the government of Sudan ground troops sometimes used vehicles.   
vii Tawilla camp had been burnt and its entire population had fled leaving behind piles of food from humanitarian agencies. 
Zam Zam had received new displaced people suffering a second order displacement after fleeing their earlier places of refugee. Tine 
near the Chadian border had been deserted and all refugees fled to Chad. Two days before the Technical Mission visited Tine, 18 
AMIS military observers had been abducted by a faction of JEM and later released after an attack on this faction by another JEM 
group that claimed to be the mainstream organization. At the time of visiting Tine four of the vehicles ceased during the abduction of 
the AMIS personnel had not yet been recovered. In the remaining camps AMIS personnel and IDPs reported the populations were 
unable to go about their normal duties or even carry out such basic duties as collection of firewood without AU-CIVPOL escorts on 
account of threats of the Janjaweed mainly. The men in these camps are virtual prisoners who cannot move because of fear of 
execution by the militias. The women have little choice but to go out and search for supplementary food and firewood and risk being 
violently raped, robbed and beaten.  Attack on IDP result in people moving to the safety of AMIS camps, the wilderness, or larger 
villages or towns, which become IDP camps. The IDPs are virtually prisoners within these camps; unable to leave them even to carry 
out vital life-support activities for fear of attacks by armed militia. By keeping their victims inside Darfur, the perpetrators are 
concealing the scale of their crimes. Even inside the camps, women remain vulnerable and humanitarian conditions are appalling”. 
viii On 25 August, an AMIS soldier was shot and wounded in South Darfur. On October 9, 2005 two AMIS soldiers and two other 
civilian technicians were killed in an ambush in Korabeche by SLA combatants. A day later 18 Military Observers were abducted in 
North-West Darfur by a reportedly breakaway JEM group and were only rescued by counter-attacks from another group in the same 
organization.  Daily reports of abductions, high jacking and robbery are all too rampant as has been in Tine.  
ix Human Rights Watch (2004) UN Safe Areas Provide no Real Security, New York, Human Rights Watch 
http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/09/01/darfur9286.htm Smith, J. Walker, B (2004) Darfur: Management of a Genocidal Crisis 
Summary report Nov 2004 Report No. S01/04 
 x First generation human rights: those that people must have to protect their right to security and well-being against the misuse 
of state's coercive powers, such as: the right to freedom of expression and association, the right of redress of grievances, and due 
process. Both sets of rights are fundamental to people-centred development. It is the second set of rights that is of most fundamental 
concern when dealing with the rights and responsibilities of people and people's organizations. Second generation human rights as 
they relate to basic human well-being, such as the rights to: food, shelter, livelihood and security of family and person, and freedom 
of movement, religion, and thought. States must accept as a universal right that the rights and obligations of citizenship are not gifts 
from the state or party. These rights are clearly spelt out in The Universal Declaration of Human Rights of the United Nations. It is 
the assertion of this paper that these articles form the legal basis for relations between state and people's organizations. Based on the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights of the United Nations, adopted and proclaimed by the General Assembly by resolution 217 A 
(III) of 10 Dec. 1948 individual human rights shall be respected fully and without any limitation whatsoever. Particularly every 
individual shall have the freedom of conscience, expression, association and peaceful assembly; and the right to engage in 
unrestricted political activity and to organize political parties, provided the exercise of such right does not infringe upon the rights of 
others. The right of nations, nationalities and peoples to self-determination is affirmed.   
xi There is now an increasing awareness of the necessity to reconcile the contradictions above in order to ensure sustainable 
natural resource management. This awareness lies behind the current encouraging trend in which institutions at all levels are 
becoming willing to acknowledge the management potential of endogenous institutions, and that it is necessary to base development 
efforts on local aspirations, and to use the local potential as a bridge between endogenous and formal institutions.xi International 
market marginalisation of the Horn has also meant, among other things (1) low incorporation of added value to raw materials. (2) 
Slow and constant decrease in prices paid for primary products in international markets and (3) while there was a sustained increase 
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in prices of goods and services that the industrialized countries send, economic instability and the sustained deterioration of natural 
resources and increase in the international gap and of dependency.  
xii The structural factor most commonly cited, as favouring African political unification is an advanced industrial economy, 
which can provide a high average of per capita national income. On the other hand, from a contingent perspective, African 
unification is installed as a result of the conscious reform initiatives of individual leaders, elite factions and social movements -- the 
trajectory of transitions is driven by the short-term calculations and immediate reactions of strategic actors. Finally, political 
unification finally depends upon the emergence of supportive set of political institutions. Institutions are recurrent and valued 
patterns of political behaviour that give shape and regularity to politics. They may be manifest as political rules or as political 
organizations. As the building blocks of African unification, certain combinations of political institutions must be extant or emergent 
if a transition is to occur. We contend that political unification can be explained with reference to two institutional factors: political 
organizations and political rules. The central hypothesis is that the relative strength of national political organizations determines 
the rules of the political game that are installed. In taking an institutional perspective, we assume that national actors express 
preferences through organizations and that these organizations vary in strength according to their resource base. The relevant 
organizations are found both in society, where they represent and aggregate individual interests, and in the State, where they check 
and balance national executive authority that may hamper African unification.  
 xiii Costantinos, BT (1994) Trajectories of political transition in Africa. ALF/GCA Washington, Addis Ababa 
xiv UN Commission on Human Rights (2000) Human Rights Now, NY 
xv UNIFEM (2005) Evaluation of the IGAD Women’s Economic Empowerment Project – Draft Report to UNIFEM (BT 
Costantinos, et al evaluators) 
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